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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5467
This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, 
denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative 
seats and the share of population held by electoral 
districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to 
preserve their political power and economic interests 
after a transition to democracy. The authors claim 
that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-
democratic elite’s political influence by over-representing 
areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with 
the elite. This biased political representation survives in 
equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to understand the role of history and institutions in the development process. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at   
mbruhn@worldbank.org.  
Using data from Latin America, the authors document 
empirically that malapportionment increases the 
probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, 
the data show that over-represented electoral districts are 
more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy 
ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented 
areas have lower levels of political competition and 
receive more transfers per capita from the central 
government, both of which favor the persistence of power 
of pre-democracy elites.  
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   “The rules of the game in a society or, more formally […] 
the humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction, […] 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.” 
 
North (1990, p. 3) 
1.  Introduction 
A broad and relatively recent literature investigates the effects of legal and political institutions 
on long-run economic development. The papers in this literature typically claim that institutions 
were shaped at some point in history, for example during the colonial era, and that these 
institutions have persisted over time and influence economic outcomes today. A number of 
papers illustrate that countries where institutions were shaped by economic and political elites of 
the past, in order to promote their own interests, tend to be less economically developed today 
(see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002 and 2006, and Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997). 
A fundamental question about this argument is, why and how do institutions persist? If 
some institutions benefit only a minority in society (the elite) and hinder economic growth, then 
why don’t they change when the country transitions to democracy? A recent paper by Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2008) provides an answer to these questions by developing a theoretical model 
that predicts that transition to democracy does not necessarily lead to a loss of economic and 
political power of the elite. In this model, the elite can influence democratic decision-making by 
undertaking several forms of investment, such as lobbying, paramilitary forces, and patronage. 
This implies that institutions and policies are not necessarily different in a democracy from what 
they are in a non-democracy
1. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by illustrating that legislative malapportionment 
can also serve as a political tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and 
economic interests in a democracy. Legislative malapportionment refers to a discrepancy 
between the share of seats and the share of the population held by each electoral district. Many 
constitutions explicitly guarantee the legal equality of each citizen’s vote, implying that electoral 
districts should have the same share of lower house representatives as their respective share of 
                                                 
1Mulligan, Gil and Sala–I-Martin (2004) show empirically that democracies do not necessarily have different public 
policies than authoritarian regimes. Moreover, Persson and Tabellini (2006) argue that whether democracies perform 
better economically than non-democracies or not depends on their institutional arrangements.  2 
 
the country’s population. However, this principle does not always hold in practice and 
consequently the lower houses in many countries are malapportioned. 
The paper first provides a political economy rationale for the emergence and persistence 
of legislative malapportionment. We base this rationale on the argument that, at the time of 
transition to democracy, groups that held political power during the preceding dictatorship
2 may 
have strong incentives to manipulate the newly established political institutions in order to 
protect their political and economic interests.
3 We claim that legislative malapportionment 
provides these groups with a way of enhancing their de jure power in democracies by over-
representing certain geographic areas and by favoring certain political parties versus others. This 
skewed political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it makes democratic 
consolidation more likely. At the same time, it is associated with lower political competition and 
distorts public policies, which also helps to preserve the power of the pre-democratic elite. 
We then test this theoretical argument using data from Latin America
4. In contrast to 
other features of political institutions, such as patronage, corruption or lobbying, 
malapportionment is clearly defined and measurable, allowing us to test the predictions of our 
argument empirically. We first rely on within country data to examine the political tendencies of 
electoral districts that are overrepresented in the sense that they have a higher share of 
representatives in the lower house than their population share. Consistent with our theoretical 
argument, we show that in the first election after transition to democracy, overrepresented 
districts are more likely to vote for parties that are close to pre-democracy ruling groups. As an 
additional check, we also provide evidence showing that overrepresented districts were more 
likely to support dictatorships in elections held in pre-democratic times. 
We then use panel data for eleven Latin American countries, covering the late XIX 
century to the present, to show that higher legislative malapportionment makes democratic 
                                                 
2 In this paper we use the term dictatorship to refer to any non-democratic regime.  
3 This argument is closely related to the models developed in Acemoglu and Johnson (2006, 2008) where the elite 
manipulates institutions to increase their political power after transition to democracy.  
4 We chose to limit the analysis to Latin America for several reasons. First, a long time series of data on legislative 
malapportionment is available for these countries. Second, the history of Latin American countries is characterized 
by many episodes of transition from dictatorship to democracy (and vice versa), providing variation for our 
empirical analysis. Finally, the relatively high degree of historical and institutional homogeneity in this sample of 
countries allows us to better isolate the relationship between legislative malapportionment and other political and 
economic outcomes. 3 
 
consolidation more likely to occur, possibly because it helps to safeguard the interests of the 
groups that held political power before the transition to democracy. Using non-linear models, our 
results suggest that the positive effect of malapportionment mostly operates through the 
transition to democracy margin. That is, higher malapportionment is positively associated with 
the probability of transitioning to democracy. In contrast, we find some evidence that the 
probability of remaining in a democracy decreases when malapportionment increases in 
countries that are already democracies. 
We also examine other political and economic policy variables associated with legislative 
malapportionment. By using within country data, we find that overrepresented districts have 
lower levels of political competition. Finally, even though overrepresented districts are not 
different from underrepresented districts with respect to output per capita and inequality, they 
receive larger transfers per capita from the central government. This last finding goes against the 
insights from traditional models of redistributive politics and confirms that unequal 
representation can translate into a higher ability to gain monetary benefits. 
Although we provide evidence suggesting that malapportioment preserves the political 
power of pre-democratic elites, we do not show explicitly that this is linked to the persistence of 
weak property rights or contracting institutions that can affect economic development (see 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The reason for this is that we do not have long panel data or 
within country data on these institutions to test whether they are correlated with 
malapportionment. The cross-country correlations depicted in Figures 1 and 2, though, show that 
countries with higher malapportionment have weaker property rights institutions and lower GDP 
per capita, as we would expect based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
presented in this paper. However, we cannot explicitly test whether these correlations are causal 
or not since we do not have an exogenous source of variation in malapportionment. 
The paper is organized follows. Section 2 provides a short discussion of 
malapportionment and develops our theoretical argument for the emergence and persistence of 
legislative malapportionment. It also outlines the possible channels through which legislative 
malapportionment could affect political and economic policy outcomes. Section 3 describes our 
data. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 4 
 
2. Motivating  Theory 
This section first discusses several general features of malapportioment and then lays out our 
theoretical argument for the origins and consequences of malapportionment. 
 
A long standing literature in political science (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Samuels and 
Snyder, 2001; Snyder and Samuels, 2004) identifies malapportionment as a formal and often 
deliberate “pathology of electoral systems”. Malapportionment – a discrepancy between the 
share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts – violates the “one 
person, one vote” principle that authors like Robert Dahl (1971, 1989) consider to be a basic 
pillar of fair democratic regimes. Even though this principle is often guaranteed by constitutional 
charts, in many countries it has been disregarded or implemented only after judicial 
intervention
5. 
As Snyder and Samuels (2004) point out, countries with a bicameral system may display 
a high level of malapportionment in the upper chamber since this chamber usually represents all 
the geographical constituencies more or less equally. While upper chamber malapportionment is, 
therefore, normatively justifiable, there is no a priori reason for weighing the votes of citizens 
unequally in the lower chamber. This paper thus focuses only on lower chamber 
malapportionment. 
Lower chamber malapportionment can arise spontaneously over time due to migration or 
different regional patterns of population growth. Western European and North American 
democracies typically have low levels of malapportionment since they periodically reapportion 
the number of seats attributed to electoral districts in response to these demographic changes 
(Snyder and Samuels, 2004). 
On the other hand, the data from Samuels and Snyder (2001) reported in Table 1 show 
that many of the countries with high legislative malapportionment are newly established or 
consolidating democracies. In addition, data from Snyder and Samuels (2004) on Latin America 
                                                 
5 For example, with two verdicts, Baker v. Carr in 1962 and Wesberry v. Sanders in 1964, the US Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of redesigning electoral districts since they were characterized by high levels of malapportionment. 
The Supreme Court’s motivation for these sentences was the necessity to safeguard the “one man, one vote” 
principle (see Casper, 1973).  5 
 
reported in Table 2 suggest that malapportionment not only characterizes democracies around the 
time of their establishment, but that it tends to persist over time in some countries
6. It therefore 
seems unlikely that malapportionment is exclusively due to dynamic phenomena such as 
migration and different regional patterns of population growth. 
In this paper, we argue that pre-democratic elites strive to promote malapportionment as a 
political tool for preserving the political and economic power they had before transition to 
democracy. This argument builds on the model of transition to democracy developed by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). We rely on the main insights of this model to study the origins 
and the persistence of malapportionment. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006 and 2008) highlight how elite groups that hold power in 
dictatorships can manipulate de jure or de facto democratic institutions in order to preserve their 
political and economic interests. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)’s model assumes the existence 
of two groups: (i) the “elite”, typically but not necessarily the richest fraction of the population
7 
that holds political power during a dictatorship, and (ii) the “citizens”, typically the poorer 
fraction of the population. In addition, the model assumes that political contracts are incomplete, 
meaning that the elite promising benefits to the citizens is not incentive compatible ex-post, and 
that the citizens can threaten the elite with revolution if they do not receive enough income 
transfers
8. In this set-up, redistributive policies are only sustainable and credible if the elite 
transfer political power, at least in part, to the citizens. The main insight of this model is that, in a 
Markovian equilibrium, democratization acts as a credible commitment to pro-citizen policies. In 
this equilibrium, the elites have to democratize in order avoid strikes, riots or - in the limit - a 
revolution.  
                                                 
6 Snyder and Samuels (2004) report that, among the Latin American countries listed in Table 2, only Colombia, 
Uruguay and Venezuela do not have formal constitutional provisions that guarantee the “one citizen - one vote” 
principle. The remaining countries (with the exception of Peru, but see footnote 14 for a discussion on this) display 
high levels of malapportionment despite the fact that their constitutions formally prescribe the equality of each 
citizen’s vote. 
7 In general, the elite do not need to be the richest group in the population. They could be any small group that earns 
political or economic rents during a dictatorship. These rents could be lost as a consequence of the transition to 
democracy. 
8 In Acemoglu and Robinson’s model, an exogenous shock determines the likelihood that citizens will threaten the 
elite with revolution. 6 
 
However, it is possible to have a transition toward a distorted or “captured” democracy, 
where the elite hold proportionally more political power than corresponds to their population 
share. This is particularly the case when the elite have vested economic interests that can be 
threatened in the new democratic regime
9. In fact, the policies preferred by the median voter in a 
non-distorted democracy (a “citizen”) are likely to threaten the elite’s economic interests, but, as 
long as the citizens – for ideological preferences or economic reasons – are still better off in a 
democracy, they may commit not to harm the elite’s interests by accepting a “captured” 
democracy. Even though this institutional arrangement is costly for the citizens – it may, for 
instance, limit the scope for redistributive policies – it can make transition to democracy more 
likely
10 since the elite are more likely to agree to a “captured” democracy than to a non-distorted 
democracy
11.  
Applying this political economy framework to our paper, we view malapportionment as a 
device that the elite can employ to keep de jure political power after transition to democracy
12. 
That is, malapportionment could allow a democracy to emerge and persist but in a “captured” 
form with the elite still being able to influence policy choices. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) 
highlight a number of other mechanisms that the elite can use to keep de facto power in a 
democracy, such as lobbying, paramilitary forces, and patronage. These mechanisms may be 
difficult to implement since they involve collective action problems. Malapportionment, on the 
                                                 
9 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use the example of the Chilean “democracia protegida” after the Pinochet 
dictatorship as an example of a distorted democracy in which the former dictator and its followers held a 
disproportionate amount of de jure political power. In general, their model implies that countries where elite groups 
hold a larger share of national income are more likely to be characterized by distorted democratic institutions. For 
the concept of “captured” democracy see also Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2008).  
10 Chapter 6 in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) describes under which circumstances granting larger power to the 
elite in a democracy makes a transition to democracy more likely. 
11 This argument is also related to Dahl (1971), who states that democracies can be defined in terms of (i) 
institutionalization and (ii) representation. Successful democracies start with (i) and later move to (ii). In contrast, 
failures start with (ii) and follow with (i). Malapportionment could thus be present in the early stages of successful 
democracies and could help their consolidation. In Section 4, we test empirically whether malapportionment fosters 
transitions to democracy and find support for this idea. 
12 Several other papers investigate the endogenous choice of different democratic institutions. Aghion, Alesina, and 
Trebbi (2004) focus on the political economy of choosing the size of the minority needed to block legislation and the 
optimal size of the supermajority necessary to govern. Similarly, Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina (2008) develop a 
theoretical model to show how the majority of a population can have strong incentives to manipulate electoral rules 
as the size of the minority changes. Finally, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) model the determinants of the choice 
between majoritarian and consensual democracies. They show that more unequal countries are more likely to choose 
a majoritarian democracy. 7 
 
other hand, can be put in place at the time of transition to democracy and, as we argue below, can 
then be self-enforcing over time.  
Snyder and Samuels (2004) discuss a number of case studies of Latin American countries 
that document how military dictatorships redistributed seats in order to over-represent areas with 
political tendencies more in line with their own. This was the case both in Argentina before 
transitioning to democracy in 1983 and in Brazil on the eve of the restoration of democratic 
gubernatorial and federal elections in 1982.  In Argentina, 44% of the seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies are assigned to districts that account for only 31% of the national population. In Brazil, 
states whose inhabitants amount to 42% of the national population are endowed with 51% of the 
Lower Chamber’s seats. In Chile, the Pinochet regime (1973-1990) behaved in a similar manner. 
Before Chile transitioned to democracy, the electoral system was redesigned to guarantee the 
overrepresentation of areas with more conservative political tendencies. As a result, after the first 
democratic election in 1989, half of the seats in the Lower Chamber were held by representatives 
from regions where only 35% of the country’s population lived
13. In Section 4, we investigate 
this issue empirically in a larger set of Latin American countries. Specifically, we test whether 
overrepresented areas tend to lend political support to parties that are close to pre-democratic 
ruling groups. 
In sum, we argue that malapportionment is a tool that pre-democratic elites can use to 
achieve a certain degree of institutional persistence. That is, even after a country formally 
transitions to democracy, policies can still be shaped by the elite’s preferences since 
malapportionment increases the number of lower house representatives of parties aligned with 
the elite. Moreover, if malapportionment is indeed a way of preserving power for the elite, then it 
is basically self-enforcing, such that it persists over time. Since malapportionment is a legal 
device, any change to it will require a plurality of votes in parliament. However, such a plurality 
is unlikely to be achieved since malapportionment distorts the allocation of seats in favor of the 
groups that stand to gain from preserving this distortion. 
Malapportionment could also lead to the persistence of the elite’s political power by 
affecting the degree of political competition within electoral districts. For example, Cox and 
                                                 
13 See Snyder and Samuels (2004): p.145 for Argentina; p. 148 for Brazil; and p. 149 for Chile. 8 
 
Katz (1999) find strong evidence that a massive redistricting in the US that eliminated substantial 
levels of malapportionment changed electoral outcomes. In particular, this reapportionment 
seems to have led to the disappearance of a long lasting pro-Republican bias in the translation of 
votes into seats in non-southern congressional elections. We test empirically whether 
malapportionment is correlated with political competition in Section 4. 
Finally, malapportioment could foster the persistence of the elite’s political power by 
changing the allocation of public funds to areas in which the members of the elites have more 
political representation. Several empirical papers establish a link between malapportionment and 
the distribution of public spending. Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) study the effects of 
court ordered redistricting in the US. They document that reapportionment did not change the 
overall level of public spending, but significantly affected its distribution among electoral 
districts within US states. Similarly, Horiuchi and Saito (2003) analyze the consequences for 
public spending of the reapportionment that took place in Japan in 1994. They find that this 
reform was associated with the equalization across municipalities of public transfers per capita. 
Other studies such as Gibson, Calvo and Falletti (2004) for Latin America and Knight (2004) for 
the US Senate highlight that overrepresented areas get a larger share of federal funds. Aghion, 
Boustan, Hoxby, and Vandenbussche (2006) show that members of the appropriation committee 
in the US legislature are able to channel more resources to electoral districts located in areas they 
represent. Although these papers document empirically that the political representation of a 
region can influence the allocation of public resources, in Section 4, we test whether this 
relationship is also present in our dataset. 
3. Data  Description 
This section describes the measures of legislative malapportionment used in the empirical 
analysis, as well as our outcome and control variables. Summary statistics for these variables are 
reported in Table 3. Both our panel data and our within country data only include Latin 
American countries. The data used in this paper comes from a number of different sources, and, 
as shown in Table 3, not all variables are available for all countries.   
 9 
 
3.1  Measures of Legislative Malapportionment 
This paper uses two main measures of lower chamber legislative malapportionment. The first 
measure is an index of malapportionment at the country level provided by Samuels and Snyder 
(2001) and Snyder and Samuels (2004). Their measure is a slight modification of the 
Loosemore–Hanby index of disproportionality for electoral systems. Country i’s overall level of 






j j i v s MAL
1 2
1    (1) 
where  j s  is the share of all seats allocated to district j and  j v  is the share of the overall 
population that resides in district j
14. The difference  j j v s   represents district j’s deviation from 
perfect apportionment. Equation 1 sums over all N electoral districts in country i. The index 
MALi thus denotes the share of seats allocated to districts that would not have received those 
seats if there were no legislative malapportionment. 
A score of zero corresponds to the case of a perfectly apportioned lower chamber where 
no citizen’s vote weighs more than another’s. Full malapportionment corresponds to a score of 
one and denotes a situation where a single district with only one voter has the right to choose all 
the legislators. Or, in an intermediate example, a value of 0.25 of the index means that one fourth 
of the seats are allocated to districts that would not have them in the absence of legislative 
malapportionment. 
We also use a within country variant on the measure of malapportionment in our 
empirical analysis. To measure electoral district j‘s degree of over- or under-representation we 
follow the existing approach in the literature (see Ansolabehere et al., 2002) and adopt the 
following measure: 
                                                 
14 The original Loosemore – Hanby’s index is meant to capture dis-proportionality, which arises when political 
parties are endowed with a share of legislative seats different from their share of votes. Therefore, in the original 






rep     (2) 
where  j s  is the share of seats allocated to the district j and  j v  is district j’s share of the 
population. Values greater than one denote overrepresentation of district j, and the opposite is 
true for values smaller than one. The data needed to compute (2) come from Samuels and Snyder 
(2001) and Snyder and Samuels (2004), as well as from national sources (the Appendix lists 
these data sources). 
3.2  Cross-country Panel Data 
We use data on democracy for a panel of eleven Latin America countries
15, covering the period 
from 1870 to 2000. Our measure of democracy is the variable polity2 from the 2007 Polity IV 
Project dataset. This indicator is coded taking into account several features of a country’s 
political institutions, such as the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, the 
constraints placed on the chief of the executive, and the competitiveness and regulation of 
political participation. It ranges from –10 to +10 with higher values corresponding to better 
democratic institutions
16. We normalize the measure so that all its values fall between zero and 
one. 
Some of our cross-country regressions control for per-capita GDP, which we take from 
Maddison (2005) for all countries but Chile. For Chile, we use data from Díaz et al. (2008) since 
they provide data for more years than Maddison (2005). 
3.3 Within-country  Data 
Our source for Latin American within country data is Bruhn and Gallego (2010). This source 
provides data on income per capita, the Gini index, temperature, rainfall, and altitude, as well as 
a landlocked dummy, for different regions within fourteen Latin American countries
17. We 
collected additional within-country information on political parties, electoral outcomes, and on 
                                                 
15 The countries included in the panel dataset are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
16 See Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010). 
17 The countries covered in this within country dataset are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 11 
 
transfers from the central government from several national sources and documents (listed in the 
Appendix). 
4. Empirical  Evidence 
This section provides empirical evidence for our theoretical argument from Section 2. We map 
the theory into the following three empirical tests. First, a key element of our argument is that 
legislative malapportionment can provide the pre-democratic elite with political influence after 
transition to democracy. In particular, the historical examples in Section 2 suggest that the pre-
democratic elite can deliberately allocate lower house representatives to over-represent electoral 
districts that are aligned with the elite. If this is indeed the case, we should observe that 
overrepresented electoral districts are more likely vote for parties associated with the pre-
democratic regime. Section 4.1 empirically examines the correlation between a district’s level of 
representation and vote shares for parties that are close to non-democratic regimes in six Latin 
American countries.  
Second, Section 2 argues that the fact that malapportionment can preserve some of the 
pre-democratic elite’s political power may make transition to democracy more likely (since the 
elite feels less threatened by a democracy and is more likely to agree to a transition to 
democracy). We investigate this mechanism in Section 4.2, by studying the cross-country, cross-
time relationship between malapportionment, transition to democracy, and democratic 
consolidation.  
Third, Section 2 suggests that overrepresented electoral districts may be characterized by 
a lower degree of political competition and may receive larger transfers from the central 
government, both of which may help to explain the persistence of the elite’s political power after 
a transition to democracy. We test whether overrepresented districts are subject to less political 
competition in Section 4.3 and whether they receive higher transfers from the central government 
in Section 4.4. 
4.1  Malapportionment and Political Representation of Pre-democracy Elites 
This section examines whether, in line with the theoretical argument and historical evidence in 
Section 2, regions in Latin America that have a larger share of representatives in the lower house 12 
 
than their population share are more likely to vote for the political parties closest to the most 
recent non-democratic regime. We identify these parties based on the information provided by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country reports and other national sources. For each state or 
region, we compute the vote shares that these political parties received in the first lower house 
election after transition to democracy. 
We collected data for 118 regions in six Latin America countries that have transitioned to 
democracy since the 1980s and that have political groups close to the previous non-democratic 
regime (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
18. The model we estimate is: 
ij i ij ij ij x rep s            (3) 
where for each country i,  ij s is the share of votes in the elections for the lower house going to the 
parties close to the pre-democracy regime in region j,  ij rep  is the log of the measure of district 
j’s over or under-representation described in Section 3.1,  ij x  a set of climate (rainfall and 
temperature) and geography (elevation and a landlocked dummy) controls, and the i  ’s are a full 
set of country fixed effects. 
The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 document that overrepresented electoral 
regions are more likely to vote for representatives belonging to the political parties close to 
former non–democratic regimes in the first election after transitioning to democracy. Our 
estimates imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the log of overrepresentation is 
associated with an increase of between 6.4 and 10 percent in the vote share going to parties close 
                                                 
18 We consider the following years for the low chamber elections and the following parties to be closest to the 
former non-democratic regime: 
  Bolivia, 1989, the A.D.N. party. 
  Brazil, 1990, the P.D.S. party. 
  Chile, 1989, the Alianza coalition. 
  Mexico, 2000, P.R.I. 
  Paraguay, 1996, the Colorado party. 
  Uruguay, 1984, the Colorado party. 
The case of Peru is also interesting, but we do not include it here because, since the 1991 reform, Peru has a lower 
chamber with only one nationwide electoral district and therefore it is not possible to compute the degree of over-
representation for each region. This reform was implemented during the Fujimori dictatorship, and in the 1990 
election the degree of over-representation was negatively correlated with the percentage of support for Cambio 90, 
the political group closest to Fujimori in the 1990 elections. Therefore, the 1991 Fujimori reform can also be 
explained with our theory. 13 
 
to pre-democracy regimes (equivalent to between 26 and 40 percent of a standard deviation of 
the vote shares going to these parties). We interpret this finding as evidence that 
malapportionment can provide political influence to pre-democracy elites after transition to 
democracy. 
Next, we conduct a robustness test in which we run regressions similar to the Equation 3 
but using data for elections that took place during non-democratic times. This is the case for the 
1978 elections in Brazil, the 1988 plebiscite in Chile, and the 1991 parliamentary elections in 
Mexico. For these elections, we computed the share of votes supporting the regime in each 
electoral region
19. The results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show a positive correlation between 
overrepresentation in democratic times and support for the elites in pre-democratic times. The 
economic significance of these results is similar to the first two columns. A one standard 
deviation rise in overrepresentation translates into an increase of between 38 and 56 percent of a 
standard deviation of votes supporting the regime.  
Table 5 provides an indication of how large the additional political influence is that pre-
democracy elites can gain after transition to democracy due to malapportionment. The table 
shows that the percentage of seats that went to parties associated with pre-democratic elites in 
the first election after transition to democracy was quite a bit larger than the percentage of votes 
that went to these same parties, in all countries other than Brazil. On average, parties associated 
with pre-democratic elites received 33.5 percent of all votes, but due to malapportionment this 
translated into 39.5 percent of seats in the lower house. 
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 supports our argument that malapportionment can 
provide political power to pre-democracy elites since malpportionment tends to give more 
political representation to parties that are aligned with the pre-democracy elite.  
4.2  Malapportionment and Democratic Consolidation 
Our finding from the previous section that malapportionment may allow pre-democracy elites to 
sustain their political power in a democracy could imply that malapportionment may make 
                                                 
19 For Brazil, we look at support for the ARENA party, for Chile at the SI option in the 1988 plebiscite, and for 
Mexico support in favor of the PRI party. 14 
 
transition to democracy and democratic consolidation more likely. This is because elites have 
fewer incentives to block a transition to democracy or to overthrow democratic regimes if they 
can exercise political power even in a democracy. This section provides empirical evidence for a 
positive relationship between legislative malapportionment and the probability of transitioning to 
a democracy. 
Our empirical strategy closely follows Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005 
and 2007). The first estimating equation is: 
1 1 1 1    
       it t i it it it it y mal d d        (4) 
where  it d  is country i’s polity2 score of democracy at time t, normalized between 0 and 1 and 
 1 1 , max 

  it it it d d d . This specification, therefore, examines only upward trends in the 
democracy score. Equation 4 includes the lagged value of democracy to capture persistence in 
this variable and the lag of the logarithm of legislative malapportionment   1  it mal . Since an 
extensive literature dating back to Lipset (1959) claims that economic prosperity has a positive 
impact on democracy and democratic consolidation, and given that malapportionment is 
correlated with income
20, we also include the log of lagged income as an additional control 
variable (yit-1)
21. Finally, we control for country and time fixed effects.  The observations, going 
from 1870 to 2000, are taken over five year intervals, and standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. 
Column 1 of Table 6a reports OLS estimates of Equation 4. The estimate of the coefficient 
of interest   is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that higher legislative 
malapportionment promotes democratic consolidation for the Latin American countries included 
                                                 
20 In a panel regression for our sample of Latin American countries, controlling for country and time fixed effects, 
the results suggest that the lagged level of malapportionment Granger – causes income, but not the opposite. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
21 Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide a critical reexamination of the empirical evidence for the modernization 
hypothesis. 15 
 
in our sample. The democracy score shows high persistence over time and income per capita is 
positively correlated with the democracy score
22. 
As a robustness check, Column 2 of Table 6a displays the estimates of the Equation 4 
using a GMM procedure, to address the potential biases that can arise when estimating a quasi-
dynamic panel with country fixed effects. The results confirm the positive effect of 
malapportionment on democratic consolidation. However, the size of the coefficient on lagged 
malapportionment increases in magnitude, suggesting that the estimates in Column 1 may indeed 
be biased.  In the GMM regression, the lagged value of income is no longer statistically 
significantly correlated with the democracy score, which is consistent with Acemoglu et al. 
(2007). 
The effect of malapportionment on democratic consolidation is also economically 
significant. Using the GMM estimates from Column 2, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in log malapportionment is associated with an increase of 0.73 standard deviations in 
the democracy index in the short-run. Taking into account that the democracy index is persistent 
over time, the long-run effect of malapportionment on democratic consolidation is even larger. In 
the long-run, a one standard deviation increase in log malapportionment leads to a one standard 
deviation increase in the democracy index. 
Next, we estimate the same equation but for downward trends in democracy by using 
 1 1 , min 

  it it it d d d  as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6a display OLS and 
GMM estimates, respectively. The point estimates are negative but statistically and economically 
insignificant, suggesting that malapportionment does not play a role in explaining the 
deterioration of democratic institutions. 
In addition, and following Acemoglu et al. (2007), we estimate two non-linear equations 
that try to account for the fact that the countries that transition to and exit from democracy may 
be endogenously selected. First, we consider a double hazard model expressed in terms of two 
functions for the probability of transitioning to democracy and the probability of remaining in 
democracy: 
                                                 
22 This last finding is not in line with Acemoglu et al. (2007). Using a sample much larger than ours, they find no 
statistically significant correlation between income and improvement in the democracy score. 16 
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where   0 2   it it polity D 1  – i.e., Dit is a transformation of the continuous polity2 variable into 
a dichotomous variable
23 and  is the Normal CDF. Due to the incidental parameters problem 
that arises in most non-linear models, we cannot include country fixed effects in these 
regressions. In order to address this issue, we assume a functional form for the country fixed 
effects, following Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Chamberlain (1980), such that:  
. , for     
_____




i        (7) 
where  is the country fixed effect and over-lined variables denote averages of the variables for 
each country i. Adding (7) to Equations 5 and 6 we get the following equations: 
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it it it it y mal y mal t y mal D D       (9) 
Table 6b contains the results for the marginal effect estimates of the non-linear models. 
The hazard model (Equation 5, reported in Column 1) suggests that malapportionment has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of transitioning to democracy. The estimates 
imply that a one standard deviation in the log of malapportionment increases the probability of 
transitioning to democracy by about 28 percent. This is a sizeable effect given that the average 
probability of transitioning to democracy for all countries and years in our sample is 26 percent.  
When we estimate the Chamberlain model (Equation 8, reported in Column 2 of Table 
6b), to control for country fixed effects, malapportionment loses statistical significance. This 
may be because we include both the lag of malapportioment and average malapportionment as 
regressors and these two variables are highly correlated (since malapportionment is highly 
persistent over time). The coefficients on both of these variables are positive and relatively large, 
                                                 
23 This dichotomous classification is based on Persson and Tabellini (2009). We use the dichotomous version of the 
polity2 index to (i) be consistent with our previous linear models and (ii) to maximize the time coverage of the 
dataset. 17 
 
suggesting that they may be imprecisely estimated due to collinearity. To examine this issue in 
more detail, we estimate the model without including lagged malapportionment (Column 3 of 
Table 6b). This specification shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient on average 
malapportionment, implying that a one standard deviation increase in log malapportionment 
increases the probability of transitioning to democracy by 26 percent. This is almost the same 
magnitude as estimated in the hazard model in Column 1 of Table 6b. Taken together, the results 
in Tables 6a and 6b suggest that malapportionment has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of transitioning to democracy. 
Columns 4 through 6 in Table 6b display non-linear estimates of the correlation between 
malapportionment and the probability that a country remains a democracy. We find that 
malapportionment negatively affects the probability of remaining in a democracy. This effect is 
statistically significant, but its economic significance is smaller than for transitions to 
democracy: a one-standard-deviation increase in malapportionment decreases the probability of 
remaining in a democracy by between 16 and 19 percent. For comparison, the average 
probability of remaining in a democracy in our sample is about 52 percent.  
This last finding indicates that increasing malapportionment in a country that already is a 
democracy does not promote democratic consolidation. On the contrary, increasing 
malapportionment after transition to democracy can endanger the democracy and can lead the 
country back to a non-democracy. Taken together with the fact that we do not find a statistically 
significant negative effect of malapportionment on the democracy index in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6a, this implies that the negative impact of malapportionment on democracy does not 
correspond to small changes in the democracy index, but to discrete changes in democracy (i.e. 
transitions from democracy to non-democracy).
24 
Overall, the results in this section are consistent with our hypothesis that 
malapportionment can make transition to democracy more likely. In addition to our results from 
Section 4.2, this provides further evidence for our argument that malapportionment may allow 
pre-democracy elites to sustain their political power in a democracy, which is why the elites are 
more likely to agree to a transition to democracy. As mentioned above, malapportioment is 
                                                 
24 A decrease in the democracy index in the linear model does not necessarily imply that the country left the 
democratic state in the non-linear model (depending on the size of the decrease in the democracy index). 18 
 
highly persistent over time, implying that the pre-democracy elite’s political power can 
potentially also persist over time in a democracy. The following two subsections investigate two 
features of malapportionment that could further allow pre-democratic elites to maintain political 
influence over time in a democracy. 
4.3  Malapportionment and Political Competition 
This section uses within country data for a number of Latin America countries to study the 
relationship between legislative malapportionment and political competition. We rely on within 
country data since our theoretical argument suggests that malapportionment shifts the 
distribution of political power across regions within countries, which may also affect the degree 
of political competition. 
Our measure of political competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of political 
concentration (HH index). We calculate this index using the share of votes going to different 
political parties (or coalitions of parties) in different regions
25. An increase in this index denotes 
an increase in the degree of political concentration. The first two columns of Table 7 display the 
results of running regressions similar to Equation 3 but using the HH index as the dependent 
variable. Columns 1 and 2 include regressions without and with controls, respectively. The 
results show a positive relationship between malapportionment and the degree of political 
concentration. However, the coefficients in the regression with controls are only marginally 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.15). In terms of economic significance, a one standard 
deviation increase in overrepresentation leads to an increase of about 0.09 standard deviations of 
our measure of political concentration. 
To further study this mechanism and to relate it to the results in Table 4, we examine the 
effect of malapportioment on an interaction term between the HH index and the vote share going 
to parties associated with pre-democracy regimes. The idea here is to study whether political 
concentration in overrepresented areas favors parties that are closer to former non–democratic 
                                                 
25 We constructed the HH index for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 




26. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 display the results without and with controls. The 
estimates in both columns are positive, statistically significant and economically relevant. A one 
standard deviation increase in overrepresentation is associated with an increase in the dependent 
variable by between 0.35 and 0.50 standard deviations.  
All in all, these results imply that the degree of political concentration, particularly in 
favor of parties that benefit from overrepresentation after transition to democracy, increases 
when overrepresentation increases, as suggested by our motivating theory. 
4.4  Malapportionment and Government Transfers 
Our theoretical discussion and the previous literature also suggest that malapportionment could 
affect the distribution of public transfers across regions. We estimate the relationship between 
malapportionment and transfers per capita using within country data
27 and a model similar to 
Equation 3, where the dependent variable is transfers per capita from the central government to 
region j. We use two alternative measures of transfers. “Total transfers” includes all transfers that 
the central government makes to a region, including transfers to state and municipal 
governments, social transfers, direct expenditures and investment by the central government, as 
well as transfers to public universities. The categories included vary from country to country, 
depending on availability. A more uniform variable is “transfers to sub-national government” 
which includes only transfers to state and/or municipal governments within a region. 
The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 confirm the previous findings in the literature 
that overrepresentation translates into higher transfers per capita from the central government. In 
terms of economic significance, these results imply that a one standard deviation increase in 
malapportionment at the local level increases transfers per capita by about ten percent of a 
standard deviation. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 check whether overrepresented areas are either poorer or 
more unequal than underrepresented areas. If this were true, then the higher transfers to these 
                                                 
26 The interaction term can be interpreted as the probability that two random voters vote for a party that is associated 
with a former non-democratic regime, because it is the probability that two people vote for the same party (the HH 
index) times the probability that a person votes for a party associated with a former non–democratic regime (the vote 
share going to this party). 
27 Our data on government transfers covers Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 20 
 
regions could be due to a welfare criterion in which poorer regions or poorer people receive more 
transfers. However, Columns 3 and 4 show that overrepresented areas are neither poorer nor 
more unequal than underrepresented areas. We thus interpret the results in Table 8 as providing 
evidence that stronger legislative representation translates into more political influence for 
overrepresented regions. Moreover, since overrepresented regions are more likely to vote for 
parties associated with pre-democratic regimes (as shown in Section 4.1), voters living in these 
regions may associate the higher transfers with these parties and may continue voting for them, 
thus re-enforcing and extending the political influence of pre-democratic elites. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, we argue that pre-democratic elites can strategically create malapportionment in 
the electoral system during the transition to democracy in order to safeguard their economic 
interests in a newly established democracy. Our results show that higher levels of 
malapportionment foster transition to democracy, presumably because it makes pre-democratic 
elites feel less threatened by the policies that might be implemented during the new democratic 
regimes. 
Using within-country data, we find – in line with the argument we propose – that 
overrepresented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties that are close to former non-
democratic regimes. Moreover, we highlight two political and economic policy features of 
malapportionment. First, malapportionment is associated with an increase in political 
concentration particularly for parties close to former non-democratic regimes. Second, 
overrepresented districts receive larger transfers per capita from the central government, despite 
the fact that they are not poorer or more unequal. This contrasts with traditional models of 
redistributive political economy and highlights that larger legislative representation induces 
greater political influence.  
In future research, we plan to investigate the effects of malapportionment on economic 
development. The decrease in political representation or miss-allocations of public transfers we 
document in this paper may have negative effects on regional development. The big challenge 
with identifying these effects though is to find a source of exogenous variation in 
malapportionment at the state level. Finally, we believe that looking at specific features of 21 
 
democratic regimes, such as legislative malapportionment, can help to better understand why 
different democracies adopt different policies and how this may be related to historical factors 
and institutional persistence. 22 
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-2 -1 0 1 2
Log malapportionment
coef = -.54060806, (robust) se = .11940018, t = -4.53
 
SOURCES: World Development Indicators for GDP per capita and Samuels and Snyder 
(2001) for the measure of malapportionment 
 















































































































-2 -1 0 1 2
Log malapportionment
coef = -.23653338, (robust) se = .05492019, t = -4.31
 
SOURCES: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for contract viability and 
Samuels and Snyder (2001) for the measure of malapportionment 
NOTES: Contract viability is an index that measures property rights enforcement, with 
higher values indicating stronger property rights 
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Transition to democracy 
(Year) 
Tanzania  0.2619 2000 
South Korea  0.2075 1987 
Ecuador  0.2040 1979 
Kenya  0.1946 2002 
Ghana  0.1782 1996 
Zambia  0.1725 1991 
Iceland  0.1684 1944 
Bolivia  0.1677 1982 
Malawi  0.1659 1994 
Chile  0.1509  1989 
SOURCES: Samuels and Snyder (2001) for the measure of malapportionment and POLITY IV database (2007) for coding transition 
to democracy.  
NOTES: Transition to democracy is defined as the first year where the variable polity2 assumes a value greater than zero with no 
subsequent reversal to below zero. The year of transition to democracy in Iceland is the year in which the country became an 








Table 2. Malapportionment and Transition to Democracy in Latin America 
 




Argentina  1983  0.15 (1985) 0.14 
Bolivia  1982  0.23 (1985) 0.17 
Brazil  1985  0.10 (1985) 0.09 
Chile  1989  0.15 (1990) 0.15 
Colombia  1957  0.15 (1960) 0.13 
Ecuador  1979  0.15 (1980) 0.20 
Honduras  1980  0.07 (1980) 0.04 
Peru  1993  0 (1995) 0 
Uruguay  1985  0.07 (1985) 0.03 
Venezuela  1958  0.06 (1958) 0.07 
SOURCES: Snyder and Samuels (2004) for the measure of malapportionment and POLITY IV database (2007) for coding transition 
to democracy. 
NOTES: Transition to democracy is defined as the first year where the variable polity2 assumes a value greater than zero with no 




Table 3. Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Countries Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Cross-country panel data          
Malapportionment  140  11  0.078 0.049 0.010  0.230 
Log of Malapportionment  140  11  -2.552 0.688 -4.605  -1.470 
Polity2 measure of democracy 140 11 0.652 0.274 0.05  1
Log  GDP  per  capita  140  11  8.073 0.656 6.520  9.275 
          
Within country data          
Share of seats/share of pop  260  14  1.772  2.854  0.556  28.024 
Log(seats/pop)  260  14  -11.100 0.982 -13.007  -8.139 
Vote  share  for  pre-democratic  elite          
- After transition to democracy 118 6 0.362 0.246 0  1
- Before transition to democracy  70  3  0.544  0.122  0.197  0.776 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann (HH) index 
of political concentration 
246  13  0.343 0.120 0.102  0.697 
Log total transfers per capita  230  12  4.167  4.772  -2.995  13.710 
Log transfers per capita to sub-
national governments 
177 9 3.869  5.312  -2.995  13.710 
Log GDP per capita  230  12  8.506  0.652  7.13  10.608 




Table 4. Malapportionment and Political Representation of Pre-Democracy Elites 
  Dependent variable: Vote share for the pre-democratic elite 
  After transition to democracy Before transition to democracy
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Log(seats/pop)  0.064** 0.100** 0.070** 0.047*
  (0.026) (0.041) (0.031) (0.026)
        
Controls  No  Yes No Yes 
        
Observations  118 118 70 70 
R-squared  0.47 0.56 0.49 0.60 
NOTES: Region level OLS regressions with country fixed effects and robust standard errors in parenthesis. Region level controls: 
landlocked dummy, average yearly temperature and temperature squared, total yearly rainfall and rainfall squared, altitude and 
altitude squared (for sources see Bruhn & Gallego, 2010). The sample in Columns 1 and 2 includes data for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The vote share, as well as the measure of over- or under-presentation, is for the first election after 
transition to democracy in these countries. Columns 3 and 4 include data from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. Significance levels: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%. 
 
 
Table 5. Discrepancy between Votes and Seats for Pre-Democratic Elites 
Country Votes  received  Seats  received 
Bolivia 42.3%  54.6% 
Brazil 8.9%  8.3% 
Chile 31.2%  40.0% 
Mexico 36.9%  44.0% 
Paraguay 41.6%  48.8% 
Uruguay 40.3% 41.4% 
Average 33.5%  39.5% 
Median 38.6%  42.7% 
NOTES: Votes shares refer to the vote shares received by parties associated with pre-democratic elites, in the first 
election after transition to democracy. In many countries, these parties receive a higher share of seats than votes due to 
malapportionment.  28 
 
Table 6a. Malapportionment and Democratic Consolidation: Linear Models 
  Dependent variable: Polity2 measure of democracy
  Upward democracy sample Downward democracy sample
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Log malapportionment t-1  0.033* 0.260*** -0.007  -0.097
  (0.016) (0.089) (0.048)  (0.090)
Log GDP per capita t-1  0.153*** 0.145 0.085  -0.163
  (0.020) (0.152) (0.097)  (0.086)
Democracyt-1  0.751*** 0.281* 0.618***  -0.165
  (0.104) (0.172) (0.195)  (0.136)
Observations  103 103 100  100
R-squared  0.879 - 0.795  -










Estimation method  OLS GMM OLS  GMM
AR (2) (p-value)    0.770 -  0.238
Sargan test (p-value)    0.108 -  0.298
NOTES: Data covers eleven Latin American countries from 1870 to 2000, over five year intervals. The OLS regressions in Columns 
1 and 3 include country and year fixed effects and have the error term clustered at the country level. The specifications in Columns 2 
and 4 include year fixed effects. The instruments for income and malapportionment in the first differenced equation are the lags of 
these variables. In all columns, the implied cumulative effect of malapportionment is the coefficient estimate of malapportionment 
divided by one minus the coefficient on lagged democracy. The p-value from a non-linear test of the significance of this cumulative 






Table 6b. Malapportionment and Democratic Consolidation: Non-Linear Models  
(Marginal Effects) 
Dependent variable:  Transition to democracy  Remaining in democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Log malapportionment t-1 0.410**  0.127   -0.284**  -0.190   
(0.184) (0.179)    (0.115)  (0.167)   
Log GDP per capita t-1 0.112  0.481  0.580  0.316**  0.505  0.503 
(0.223) (0.477) (0.437) (0.129) (0.353) (0.354)
Log mean GDP per capita    -0.635  -0.877    -0.285  -0.226 
 (0.566)  (0.639)    (0.497)  (0.496) 
Log mean malapportionment    0.364  0.497**    -0.166  -0.332** 
 (0.234)  (0.218)    (0.202)  (0.140) 
Observations  27 27 27  96  96  96 
Estimation Method  Hazard  Chamberlain  Hazard  Chamberlain 
NOTES: Data covers eleven Latin American countries from 1870 to 2000, over five year intervals. The dependent variable in 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 is equal to one if there is a Transition to Democracy, and equal to zero otherwise; it is equal to one in Columns 4, 
5 and 6 if a country Remains in Democracy, and equal to zero otherwise. This classification is based on a dichotomous democracy 
variable that equals one if the polity2 measure is above zero, and zero otherwise (Persson and Tabellini, 2009). All regressions in 









Table 7. Malapportionment and Political Competition 
 
  Dependent variable:
  Herfindahl-Hirschmann (HH) index 
of political concentration 
 
HH index times share of votes 
for  parties close to former 
dictatorships  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Log(seats/pop)  0.016*** 0.005 0.032**  0.046**
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)  (0.019)
        
Controls  No Yes No  Yes
        
Countries  13 13 6  6
Observations  246 246 166  118
R-squared  0.77 0.78 0.44  0.54
NOTES: Region level OLS regressions with country fixed effects and robust standard errors in parenthesis. Region level controls: 
landlocked dummy, average yearly temperature and temperature squared, total yearly rainfall and rainfall squared, altitude and 







Table 8. Malapportionment and Transfers from the Federal Government 
 
  Dependent variable:




per capita to 
sub-national 
governments
Log GDP per 
capita  Log Gini index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Seats/Pop)  0.461*** 0.528*** 0.038 0.005
  (0.060) (0.079) (0.065) (0.038)
       
Countries  12 9 12 9 
Observations  230 177 230 166
R-squared  0.99 0.99 0.55 0.78
NOTES: Region level OLS regressions with country fixed effects and robust standard errors in parenthesis. Regressions include the 
following region level controls: landlocked dummy, average yearly temperature and temperature squared, total yearly rainfall and 
rainfall squared, altitude and altitude squared (for sources see Bruhn & Gallego, 2010). The variable “total transfers” includes all 
transfers that the central government made to a region, including transfers to state and municipal governments, social transfers, direct 
expenditures and investment by the central government, as well as transfers to public universities. The categories included vary from 
country to country, depending on availability. A more uniform variable is “transfers to sub-national government” which includes 
only transfers to state and/or municipal governments within a region. This variable is not available for Chile, Ecuador, and Honduras. 
Significance levels: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%. 30 
 
Appendix.  Data Sources 
 
Country Political  Outcomes  Transfers 
Argentina  Samuels and Snyder; Cámara Nacional 
Electoral 
Ministerio de Economía y Producción 
Bolivia  Samuels and Snyder; Corte Nacional 
Electoral 
Ministerio de Economía Y Finanzas 
Públicas 
Brazil  Samuels and Snyder; Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral 
IBGE, diretoria de Pesquisas, 
Coordenação de Contas Nacionais 
Chile  Samuels and Snyder; Tribunal 
Calificador de Elecciones 
SINIM 
Colombia  Samuels and Snyder; Consejo Nacional 
Electoral 
Departamento Nacional de Planeacion 
Ecuador  Samuels and Snyder  Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 
El Salvador  Samuels and Snyder  Ministerio de Hacienda 
Guatemala  Samuels and Snyder;Tribunal Supremo 
Electoral 
Ministerio Finanzas Públicas 
Guatemala 
Honduras  Samuels and Snyder; Tribunal Supremo 
Electoral 
CEPAL: "Honduras: El Papel de los 
municipios en el combate a la 
pobreza." 
Mexico  Samuels and Snyder; Mexico Electoral 
1970-2003 Banamex CD 
 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público (SHCP); Consultora 
Aregional.com; Cuenta de la 
Hacienda Pública Federal año 2000 
Panama  Samuels and Snyder; Tribunal Electoral  - 
Paraguay  Samuels and Snyder; Tribunal Supremo 
de Justicia Electoral 
Ministerio de Hacienda. Sub 
Secretaria de Estado de 
Administracion Financiera 
Uruguay  Samuels and Snyder; Corte Electoral  Tribunal de Cuentas Uruguay 
Venezuela  Samuels and Snyder; Consejo Nacional 
Electoral 
- 
 